Causes and Consequences of Expectation Trajectories: "High" on Optimism in a Public Ballot Initiative

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Abstract
Although expectations are key theoretical antecedents of emotion and behavior, expectations are typically examined as static properties without deep consideration of their temporal dynamics. We surveyed residents of California over five time points, during the month preceding a public ballot initiative on cannabis legalization (California Proposition 19) and after the election, to examine both the causes and the consequences of residents' expectation trajectories regarding the vote's outcome. Our results point to the importance of changes in individuals' expectations over time. Specifically, well-informed voters were likely to lower their expectations regarding the measure's passage as the vote neared, in line with polling results, but being informed about the initiative had less impact on expectation trajectories among voters who favored the measure than among those who opposed it. Furthermore, supporters who maintained their optimism about the initiative's outcome over time were more likely to vote and were more disappointed following the measure's failure, compared with supporters who became more pessimistic. The findings suggest that temporal changes in people's optimism and expectations play a unique role in social behavior.

> Optimism is inevitably the last hope of the defeated.
>
> —Albert Meltzer (cited in
> Quotes Archive, 2013)

Scholars discovered long ago that voters tend to predict that their favored candidate will win (Hayes, 1932). This tendency to forecast events in accordance with one's preferences is extremely robust and has been systematically observed across decades of U.S. presidential elections and elections around the world (Granberg & Brent, 1983; Granberg & Holmberg, 1988), with correlations between preferences and expectations typically exceeding .50.

Such strong links between preferences and electoral expectations seem irrational, at least with respect to the unlikely winners; only supporters of the likely winner should have valid reasons for optimism. That supporters of unlikely winners are often optimistic suggests that voters sometimes fail to consider objective, election-relevant

information (e.g., relevant polling data) when forming expectations. Consequently, studies have targeted knowledge of election-relevant issues as a constraint on the relationship between preferences and expectations (Dolan & Holbrook, 2001; Granberg & Brent, 1983; Zaller, 1992). However, different researchers have conceptualized and measured political knowledge in ways that are not equivalent, so findings are difficult to interpret as a whole. Some studies have relied on proxy variables such as educational attainment and political investment, but these variables are often ambiguous with regard to their relation to election-relevant knowledge. For example, a person can be educated and partisan yet apathetic and uninformed about politics (Granberg & Brent, 1983). Thus, it is important to measure knowledge directly by

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assessing a voter's knowledge of factual information relevant to the election (Deli Carpini & Keeter, 1993).

Although it is intuitive that possessing accurate election-relevant knowledge would constrain the influence of preferences on expectations, evidence for this intuition has proved inconsistent. For example, in research on Israeli parliamentary elections, Babad (1995) observed that more-informed political-science students did not show a weaker link between their preferences and expectations, even when they were informed about the party seat differential going into the election (which always tilts the odds of winning one way or another). Similarly, even accurate knowledge of current poll results often fails to reduce this link, in part because people discount or "misremember" poll results in accordance with their own preferences (Babad, 1997; Kisilevsky & Levine, 2006). Knowledge may successfully restrain the influence of preferences on expectations only for people who are minimally invested in the political outcome (Granberg & Brent, 1983; see also Dolan & Holbrook, 2001).

Taken together, these findings suggest that knowledge may not, as initially assumed, always constrain the relationship between preferences and electoral expectations, particularly among people who are most invested in election results. Furthermore, these relationships are complex and depend on features of a given election (Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 2002; Meifert, Huber, Gschwend, & Urban Pappi, 2011), which may be particularly problematic in light of the heavy focus in this research area on U.S. presidential and Israeli parliamentary elections. Given the conflicting findings and limited evidence, the role of knowledge in shaping electoral expectations demands additional attention.

The Role of Expectation Trajectories

An additional key limitation of prior research is that it has treated expectations as static properties. In other words, studies have usually examined electoral expectations at one point in time and paid little attention to how they change as the election draws closer. As a result, previously established links between expectations and knowledge speak only to patterns across individuals, not to the dynamics within an individual, although researchers' interpretations have often implied such intraindividual processes (Babad, 1995). This approach ignores the fact that people's expectations, results of opinion polls, and political forces change throughout the run-up to an election. These changes are especially relevant in the weeks leading up to the election day in light of the influence of expectations on voting behavior. For example, supporters who anticipate that their preferred candidate or ballot proposition will fail may not bother to vote, and voters who anticipate that a candidate will win may "get on the bandwagon" and support that candidate (Mutz, 1998).

We thus conducted a study to examine expectation trajectories, or patterns of change in expectations within individuals, and how these trajectories reflect both individual differences and contextual variables. Specifically, we conceptualized electoral expectation trajectories as latent growth curves (Willett & Sayer, 1994). These curves represent functions assumed to underlie individuals' change in expectations over time; a given individual's curve is defined by the initial value of the function (i.e., the intercept) and a factor of change for that individual (i.e., the slope). Latent growth curve analysis allowed us to examine individuals' expectation trajectories by regressing these intercept and slope values on factors of theoretical interest (i.e., preferences and knowledge), and to examine how the slope and intercept themselves shaped other relevant variables (i.e., voter turnout and emotion).

Using this approach, we examined expectation trajectories over the month preceding the November 2, 2010, vote on Proposition 19 (Prop. 19) in California regarding the legalization of cannabis for recreational use. This proposition was a ballot measure brought to voters by a passionate group of supporters who collected more than 700,000 signatures and mounted a large public campaign (McKinley, 2009). Although polling had suggested likely passage, public support dropped substantially a few weeks before the vote (Van Oot, 2010; see Fig. 1), and the measure failed, with 46.2% of Californians who voted on the measure voting in support. This vote presented a perfect opportunity to examine the role of expectation trajectories in the context of voting behavior. We examined the impact of preferences and knowledge on expectations by considering both interindividual differences and intraindividual change. Uncertainty about the outcome of the ballot initiative allowed voters' biases to have a potentially large impact on their behavior (see Granberg & Brent, 1983). Our sample of California students and urban residents was not perfectly representative of California's total voting base, but the sample allowed us to examine processes of key theoretical importance in a consequential, real-world setting. Finally, by focusing on a public ballot initiative, this research extends prior work on electoral expectations that focused almost exclusively on presidential and parliamentary elections.

Hypotheses

First, we hypothesized that supporters of Prop. 19 would predict a higher likelihood of passage at the outset of the study than would opponents of the measure, which would be in line with desirability biases (Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 2010; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). We further

Fig. 1. Public support for California's Proposition 19 during the month preceding the vote (late September through October 2010). The information in the graph is based on public opinion polling that queried respondents about their support for the proposal. Each data point represents an individual poll, and the date indicates the last day of the polling period. The bars represent margins of error, and a linear trend line is superimposed over the data to illustrate the change in public support over time. From left to right, the polls were conducted by The Field Poll, Public Policy Institute of California, Survey USA, Ipsos, EMC Research, Public Policy Institute of California, Survey USA, *Los Angeles Times* and the University of Southern California, Public Policy Polling, Suffolk University, Survey USA, The Field Poll, and Public Policy Polling (Wikipedia, 2010).

anticipated that knowledge would constrain (i.e., interact with) the relationship between preferences and initial expectations (e.g., Dolan & Holbrook, 2001; Kisilevsky & Levine, 2006), such that more knowledgeable voters would express more moderate expectations, regardless of their preferences.

Second, drawing on research indicating that people tend to become less optimistic about an outcome as the "moment of truth" draws near (Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Sweeny, Carroll, & Shepperd, 2006), we hypothesized that both supporters and opponents of Prop. 19 would become more moderate in their expectations over time. Specifically, we anticipated that supporters would judge the likelihood of passage to be lower over time, and opponents would judge the likelihood of passage to be higher over time, with both tendencies reflecting a shift toward pessimism (i.e., toward expectation of their less-desired outcome).

Third, we anticipated that participants who were more informed about the issue would be more attuned to changes in popular and political support for Prop. 19. Because polls indicated a clear drop in popular support for Prop. 19 during the month before the vote (Fig. 1), we hypothesized that participants who were more informed about the initiative would report greater declines in their expectations of passage (compared with less-informed participants) as they learned that popular opinion and political will had shifted. In addition, we examined whether preferences moderated the relationship between knowledge and expectation trajectories. We anticipated that supporters would experience tension between their preferences and a dawning realization that the measure was likely to fail, such that knowledgeable supporters would still maintain high expectations of passage over time. In contrast, we anticipated that knowledgeable opponents of Prop. 19 would readily lower (or keep low) their expectations of passage as a result of the consistency between their desires and the objective information indicating likely failure.

Fourth, we hypothesized that supporters who maintained their optimism despite a negative political headwind would be particularly likely to vote on Election Day, as they would perceive their vote as consequential in a close race (Mutz, 1998). That is, we hypothesized that supporters with a flatter expectation trajectory (one that remained relatively high) would be more likely to vote.

Finally, we examined the relationship between expectation trajectories and supporters' disappointment when Prop. 19 failed. Although researchers have found that more optimistic expectations exacerbate disappointment

when desired outcomes do not occur, and that this holds true for both personal and electoral outcomes (Krizan et al., 2010; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997), to our knowledge no research has directly examined whether changes in expectations have an effect on level of disappointment. On the basis of previous theorizing that people who lower their expectations in the final moments prior to receiving feedback may shield themselves from disappointment (Sweeny et al., 2006; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010), we hypothesized that supporters who reduced their expectations of Prop. 19's passage would experience less disappointment with the outcome, compared with supporters who remained optimistic.

Method

Participants

One hundred seventy-five California residents were recruited from two sources. Ninety participants were community residents recruited via the Craigslist Web sites for the areas of Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Palm Springs, and the Inland Empire. The listing was titled "Paid Research Study: Evaluate the 2010 Election" and specified a focus on "California Proposition 19 on cannabis legalization." Interested parties e-mailed the researchers and, following confirmation that their e-mail accounts were legitimate, were sent Web links to the surveys. Participants could earn up to $30 for completing all five surveys. Eighty-five participants were students from psychology courses at the University of California, Riverside; they participated in exchange for course credit after responding to a similar advertisement from the psychology department. All participants were recruited between September 30 and October 12, 2010. Retention (89% at completion) was facilitated by making the full compensation contingent on continued participation.

Data from 17 participants were removed from the analyses because their responses were not sufficiently complete or were not timely. This yielded a final sample of 158 participants (61% female, 39% male; age range = 18–75 years, mean age = 25.6 years, *SD* = 10.5 years) who provided complete responses over the entire course of the study in a timely manner. Forty-two percent were White, 26% were Hispanic or Latino, 26% were Asian, and 5% were Black (percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding). The racial and ethnic makeup of our sample was similar to that of the population of California as reported by the 2010 census (40% White non-Hispanic, 38% Hispanic or Latino, 13% Asian, 6% Black, 3% other; U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Forty percent of our sample (most of the nonstudents) had a college degree.

Procedure and measures

Data were collected in five waves. During the first assessment (October 3–12), participants reported their electoral expectations ("In your opinion, how likely is it that Prop. 19 will pass?"; 1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very likely*), provided demographic information, and answered questions regarding their knowledge of and preference for the measure. Preference was indicated in response to the item, "What do you want the outcome of the Prop. 19 vote to be?" (1 = *strongly want it to fail*, 4 = *don't care*, 7 = *strongly want it to pass*). Proposition-relevant knowledge was assessed with factual questions regarding Prop. 19 and its political status in California. Ten questions assessed general facts about Prop. 19 (e.g., "On what date will the vote on Prop. 19 take place?" and "Would current laws regarding driving during cannabis intoxication change?") and its political support (e.g., "Has the California Democratic Party officially endorsed Prop. 19?" and "Has the National Black Police Association officially endorsed Prop. 19?"). The number of correct responses served as an index of proposition-relevant knowledge. The percentage of correct responses across the items ranged from 31% to 80%; the average correlation between a given item and the total index score (Kendall's *tau-b*) was .31 (range = .05–.45). The validity of the measure was supported by a positive correlation of .15 (*p* = .06) with educational attainment, a typical proxy variable for political knowledge.

The next three assessments were conducted during the periods of October 18 through 25 and October 25 through 30, and on November 2; each focused on expectations. The final assessment was completed between November 3 and 5. Participants reported whether and how they voted ("How did you vote on Prop. 19?"; possible answers were "didn't vote," "voted yes," and "voted no") and indicated their reaction to the initiative's outcome by rating their agreement with the statement "I feel disappointed with the outcome of the vote on Prop. 19" on a scale from 1, *not at all*, to 7, *very much*. (See Table 1 for descriptive statistics regarding the measured variables.)

Analytic strategy

To test our hypotheses about causes and consequences of expectation trajectories, we estimated latent growth curves using the Mplus 5.0 software (http://www.statmodel.com). These curves represented repeated measures of expectations as a function of time and described each individual with a regression equation that modeled expectations as a function of a latent intercept (initial level) and slope (change). These individual functions were then aggregated to estimate the overall mean and variance for the intercept

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Variables: Preference for and Knowledge About Proposition 19, Expectations Regarding Its Passage, and Disappointment in the Electoral Result (N = 158)

Variable	M	SD	Correlations						
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Preference	4.56	1.83	—						
2. Knowledge	5.59	1.78	.16*	—					
3. Preference × Knowledge	0.22	1.70	.68**	.10	—				
4. Expectations at Time 1	4.17	1.48	.49**	−.04	.18*				
5. Expectations at Time 2	4.24	1.31	.37**	−.02	.21*	.52**			
6. Expectations at Time 3	4.21	1.41	.22*	−.18*	.12	.53**	.67**		
7. Expectations at Time 4	4.19	1.53	.27**	−.22*	.16*	.51**	.61**	.72**	
8. Disappointment	3.30	2.06	.69**	.20*	.52**	.36**	.36**	.25**	.37**

Note: Times 1 through 4 refer to assessments from early October through November 2, 2010.
*p < .05. **p < .01.

and slope, which provided summary information about change at the level of the group. This strategy allowed an examination of antecedents and consequences of expectation trajectories within a unitary modeling framework that accounted for both between-person and within-person variability.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Before turning to our key results, we briefly consider general trends in the data (Table 1). First, most participants supported Prop. 19, and as a result, most expressed at least some disappointment in the outcome. Second, political knowledge varied considerably across participants (range = 1 to all 10 answers correct) and was only weakly linked to support for Prop. 19 (r = .16). Aggregate

expectations regarding the proposition's likelihood of passage did not systematically change over the course of the study (F = 0.13, p = .94). Finally, 57% of participants reported voting on the measure (40% in favor, 17% against).

Support for and knowledge about Proposition 19

We used full-information maximum likelihood procedures to estimate intercepts and linear slopes of expectation trajectories.[1] To test our hypotheses regarding predictors of expectation trajectories, we regressed these parameters on Prop. 19 preferences and knowledge and on their interaction term (centered). The model fit the data well (Fig. 2), $\chi^2(11)$ = 8.22, p = .69, comparative fit index (CFI) = 1.00, root-mean-square error of approximation


Fig. 2. Model of the relationship between preference for and knowledge about Proposition 19 and the intercept (I) and slope (S) of trajectories for expectations concerning its passage (N = 158). The interaction between preferences and knowledge is represented by the solid black circle. Asterisks indicate significant coefficients (†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01). Pearson's correlations appear next to the double-headed arrows; all regression coefficients are unstandardized.

(RMSEA) = .00, 90% confidence interval (CI) = [.00, .07], standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMSR) = .02; it accounted for 44% and 48% of the variance in the intercept and slope, respectively.[2]

When we examined the intercept of expectations, we confirmed our hypothesis that supporters of Prop. 19 would be more optimistic about its ultimate passage than its opponents would be. To illustrate the findings, we plotted the expectation trajectories for moderate supporters and moderate opponents of Prop. 19 (those scoring 6 and 2, respectively, on our 7-point preference scale) at three levels of knowledge about the proposal (Fig. 3). Although proposition-relevant knowledge did not significantly predict the initial level of expectations, the interaction term did. As Figure 3 shows, the relationship between initial level of expectations and knowledge was stronger among supporters than among opponents, and more-knowledgeable supporters initially had lower expectations that the measure would pass than did less-knowledgeable supporters. Knowledge was unrelated to initial expectations among opponents.

Greater preference for Prop. 19 predicted a more negative slope of expectations for its passage (Fig. 2): Supporters' expectations that the measure would pass decreased over time, whereas opponents' expectations that the measure would pass increased (Fig. 3). As hypothesized, both supporters and opponents became less optimistic with respect to their desired outcome, a pattern consistent with a drop in optimism typically observed in individuals before they receive feedback about important outcomes.

Greater knowledge also predicted a more negative slope of expectations (Fig. 2). Consistent with our hypothesis that informed participants would be more attuned to the drop in popular support for Prop. 19 that occurred throughout October, the data showed that more knowledgeable participants were more likely to lower their expectations of its passage (Fig. 3).

However, these findings were qualified by a marginal interaction between Prop. 19 preferences and knowledge (Fig. 2). As illustrated by the trajectories in Figure 3, political knowledge predicted the slope of expectation trajectories; however, political knowledge had less of an effect on expectations among supporters than among opponents of Prop. 19. Specifically, supporters' expectation trajectories were less sensitive to their level of knowledge, so these participants maintained high expectations even when they were knowledgeable. Knowledgeable opponents of Prop. 19 appropriately judged the likelihood of passage to be low as Election Day approached; in contrast, less-knowledgeable opponents judged passage to be more likely over time (a result consistent with the general tendency to become more reserved in expectations, as previously described).


Fig. 3. Expectation trajectories regarding the passage of Proposition 19 (Prop. 19) as a function of preferences for and knowledge about the proposal (*N* = 158). Intercepts and slopes were estimated separately for hypothetical moderate supporters of Prop. 19 (rating of 6 on the 7-point preference scale; left panel) and hypothetical moderate opponents (rating of 2 on the preference scale; right panel). Trajectories for people with low, average, and high knowledge (1 *SD* below the sample mean, at the mean, and 1 *SD* above the mean, respectively) were estimated in each case, and these values were used to compute initial expectations and their change across time.

Voting behavior and disappointment among supporters

We also examined the consequences of expectation trajectories. First, to examine the relationship between trajectories and voter turnout, we estimated the same model described previously but only for supporters ($n = 102$), thus eliminating the preference variable and its interaction term from the analysis. Supporters were defined as individuals who scored above the midpoint (4, *don't care*) on the preference scale.[3] We regressed the likelihood of voting in support on knowledge and the intercept and slope of expectation trajectories. The model fit the data well, $\chi^2(10) = 5.97$, $p = .81$, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI = [.00, .07], SRMSR = .07, accounting for substantial variance, $R^2 = .46$, $p < .05$.

What factors predicted whether participants would turn out to vote for Prop. 19? First, greater knowledge predicted voting among supporters of Prop. 19, $b = 0.11$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .001$. This finding may reflect the fact that more-knowledgeable voters are consistently more likely to vote at all (Meifert et al., 2011). A more critical finding was that voting in support of Prop. 19 was predicted by the slope of expectation trajectories but not by the intercept. Specifically, maintaining optimism about Prop. 19's passage (i.e., a shallower slope) predicted a greater likelihood of voting for Prop. 19, $b = 0.92$, $SE = 0.44$, $p < .05$. The intercept did not significantly predict voting behavior ($p > .10$).[4]

Second, to examine the relationship between expectation trajectories and disappointment with the outcome, we followed the same strategy, but with disappointment as the final dependent variable ($n = 95$ respondents at the last assessment). We also included the continuous preference measure to control for intensity of preferences among supporters, which likely influenced disappointment. This model also fit the data well, $\chi^2(12) = 11.17$, $p = .28$, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .04, 90% CI = [.00, .12], SRMSR = .07, accounting for substantial variance, $R^2 = .46$, $p < .01$. Greater knowledge was predictive of greater disappointment, $b = 0.22$, $SE = 0.11$, $p = .05$, which was likely a function of a greater emotional investment in the outcome. Participants with stronger preferences for the measure were more disappointed, $b = 1.04$, $SE = 0.26$, $p < .001$, and a shallower slope of expectation trajectories was significantly related to greater disappointment, $b = 2.94$, $SE = 1.27$, $p < .05$. The initial level of expectations (i.e., the intercept) showed a trend toward a relationship with disappointment, but this relationship did not reach significance, $b = 0.17$, $SE = 0.24$, $p = .47$. In sum, supporters who maintained optimism about the outcome of the initiative were especially likely to be disappointed upon learning that Prop. 19 failed.

Discussion

We identified key predictors and consequences of expectation trajectories in the first systematic investigation of these trajectories in an electoral context. We documented substantial variation in expectation trajectories among respondents. Individuals varied greatly not only in their initial electoral forecasts, but also in the pattern of change in these forecasts. As in previous studies (Granberg & Brent, 1983; Krizan et al., 2010), we found that preference was the strongest predictor of initial expectations. Knowledge of initiative-relevant issues did not predict initial expectations, and the link between preferences and these expectations was somewhat weaker among more knowledgeable voters. Although desirability biases and motivated reasoning partially explain such preference-expectation links, they also reflect the constraints of biased exposure to other voters' preferences, media sources, and general political information (Krizan et al., 2010). Regardless of the source of such preference-expectation links, this finding reaffirms the central importance of electoral preferences in shaping expectations of electoral outcomes but suggests that being informed constrains the tendency of preferences to shape expectations.

Our study showed that expectation trajectories are uniquely important in electoral contexts, and illuminated both the antecedents and the consequents of shifts in expectations over the critical weeks before a vote. First, we confirmed that the tendency for people to become less optimistic as the time to receive personal feedback approaches (Sweeny et al., 2006) extends to collective social outcomes such as elections. Specifically, we found a general trend for people on both sides to relinquish optimism about their desired outcome as the election drew near. This finding is noteworthy because electoral outcomes are quite different from personal outcomes; for example, campaigns typically invest substantial resources in maintaining optimism among supporters to the bitter end, which may explain why electoral expectations do not always shift toward pessimism (Krizan et al., 2010).

Second, we found that people who were more knowledgeable about initiative-relevant issues were more likely to lower their expectations for the proposition's passage as Election Day approached. This pattern fit with the widely reported drop in popular support for Prop. 19 between September and November 2010 (Fig. 1) and confirmed that performance-based measures of knowledge (as opposed to proxy measures such as educational attainment) have substantial utility when studying electoral expectations.

Third, we found that political knowledge had less influence on expectation trajectories among supporters of Prop. 19, who maintained their optimism regarding

passage despite weakened public support for the proposition in the final weeks before the election. Supporters likely experienced tension between their preferences and information suggesting the measure would not pass, but our results suggest that their preferences dominated and promoted maintenance of optimism. This finding further supports the conclusion that knowledge does not negate the influence of one's preferences.

Equally important were the consequences of expectation trajectories. Among supporters of the measure, people who maintained optimism about Prop. 19's chances of passage were most likely to turn out and vote in favor. This finding speaks to the motivating power of positive expectations (Bandura, 1982) and affirms the value of the intense efforts campaigns make to maintain voters' optimism to the end. There is a price to be paid for maintaining optimism, however: Sustaining optimistic expectations in the face of information suggesting the likelihood of failure can exacerbate disappointment among supporters.

Taken together, our findings emphasize the theoretical utility of examining expectations as dynamic entities. Our examination of expectation trajectories confirmed prior findings regarding the power of preferences but also revealed that knowledge, at times, restrains optimism when changes in the facts call for such restraint. Furthermore, our study revealed supporters to be somewhat immune to the influence of their own knowledge, as their expectations remained high until the outcome was known regardless of how well informed they were. Finally, resoluteness in supporters' expectations increased their likelihood of turning out for the vote but also of reacting with disappointment in the face of failure. These results suggest that expectation trajectories predict consequences of key importance to political scientists. Taken together, these findings suggest that understanding individual-level change in expectations and its relation to personal and contextual factors should be a central focus for researchers studying likelihood judgments.

Acknowledgments

We thank Fred Lorenz and Stephanie Madon for their helpful comments on the manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

Notes

1. Given data and a specified model, the method of maximum likelihood selects values of the model parameters to produce a distribution that gives the observed data the greatest probability (i.e., parameters that maximize the likelihood function). Mplus specified the intercept as a constant value (1) at each time point and the slope as a step function (0, 1, 2, 3) that modeled the temporal change across the four observed time points.

2. We also examined the nature of the sample (student vs. general population) as a moderator of the effects presented in this article but found no substantive effects.

3. We also conducted the same analyses for opponents but found no significant effects.

4. When we operationalized turnout as whether a person voted, regardless of what he or she voted for, the slope similarly predicted behavior, $\beta = 0.59$, $SE = 0.37$, $p = .10$, although the relationship was marginally significant.

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